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TYCHÊ IN POLYBIOS: NARRATIVE ANSWERS TO 
A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION 
 
 
Polybios has a reputation for being an eminently rational historian. For this 
reason, the prominence in his Histories of tychê as a force apparently actively 
involved in historical events has often been a cause for concern and puzzle-
ment to scholars. In the extant part of Polybios’ Histories, tychê appears no 
fewer than  times. In many of these instances it appears to be a force with 
some power over events in the human world, and, moreover, the concept of 
this force seems closely intertwined with Polybios’ ideas of historical causal-
ity and the usefulness of historiography. In order to understand the Histories 
it is therefore necessary to understand Polybios’ use of tychê. This under-
standing, however, is hampered by two problems. The first problem is the 
discrepancy between what Polybios explicitly says about how a historian can 
legitimately use tychê as an explanation, and the way in which he actually 
employs the term, and, connected with this, between his explicit statement 
in several passages that Rome’s world dominion has been brought about by 
tychê and his equally explicit rejection of this explanation in other passages. 
The second problem is the apparent instability of the meaning of tychê in the 
Histories: sometimes it seems to be a predestining force akin to fate, at other 
times it is said to act completely at random, and occasionally it seems to be a 
just power working for vengeance.  
 In this paper I shall begin by discussing the first of these two problems 
and offer a solution based on narrative rather than philosophical considera-
tions. I shall then discuss the second problem and try to get to grips with 
what tychê meant for Polybios, again looking to narrative rather than phi-
losophical theories. Finally I shall draw some conclusions about Polybios’ 
historiographical project and the impact of his Histories on the ancient and 
modern reader. 
 
The nature of tychê in Polybios’ Histories has been much discussed, and be-
fore I add my contribution, a brief overview of the most important mile-
stones in the vast literature is in order. In the late th century, discussions 
centred on the possible philosophical affiliations of Polybios, to which his use 
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Marie Martin for reading through various early incarnations of this article. Thanks are 
also due to the anonymous readers for Histos for pointing out some weaknesses and help-
ing to strengthen the argument. All mistakes and obscurities that remain are, of course, 
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of tychê was thought to be a key. Hirzel () argued that tychê in the Histories 
is identical with the Stoic pronoia. Von Scala () developed this theory fur-
ther and suggested that tychê develops over the course of the Histories from 
the Peripatetic random tychê into a rational force closer to the Stoic pronoia. 
This theory was for a while generally followed, but has since been univer-
sally rejected because it depends on splitting up tightly composed passages 
into what is supposed to be Polybios’ original text and his later additions. In 
modern scholarship, Eckstein (() –) has returned to the idea of 
Polybios’ development, but rather than philosophical, he sees it as psycho-
logical: Polybios developed over the course of his life (and his writing) from 
an optimist, who believed in the power of human reasoning to change the 
world, into a pessimist who accepted irrationality, both in human beings 
and in the world, the latter represented by tychê. However, Eckstein’s admis-
sion that Polybios’ portrayal of tychê is not consistent and his development 
not linear to some extent undermines his argument. Even more recently, 
Brouwer () has returned to the idea that Polybios was influenced by the 
Stoic view of tychê and has explained the discrepancy in his use of the term 
as reflecting the Stoic distinction between the Sage, who knows that tychê 
does not exist and that the world is ruled by reason, and the inferior person, 
who takes refuge in tychê in order to explain the otherwise inexplicable. It 
will be clear from my analysis below that I think this is far too philosophi-
cally consistent an explanation for what goes on in Polybios’ text. 
 The prevalent modern view was first formulated very briefly by De 
Sanctis () and developed in a bit more detail by Shorey (). The latter 
argues that the inconsistencies of Polybios’ concept of fortune are ) no more 
inconsistent than that of most writers or thinkers, ancient and modern, and 
) often rhetorical rather than conceptual. That is, Polybios was a rationalist 
in so far as he was striving to find a rational explanation for events, but he 
also had a deep-seated traditional morality which was partly based on a 
concept of the changeability of fortune; and in any case, personified expres-
sions of tychê were so common in Hellenistic language usage that it would 
not have occurred to him to avoid them.  
 The two greatest Polybios scholars of our time, F. W. Walbank and P. 
Pédech, both agree that Hellenistic rhetorical usage explains some of the oc-
currences of tychê in the Histories, but argue that other instances show that 
                                           
 For a typical example see Cuntz () –. Laqueur () – argues for the 
opposite development, i.e. from rationalist to believer in capricious tychê.  
 De Sanctis (), Shorey (), Roveri (), von Fritz () –, Walbank () 
–, Pédech () –, Ferrary () –. 
 Von Fritz () – also has some interesting thoughts on Polybios’ use of tychê, 
some of which I shall refer to below, but does not offer an overarching theory. 
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tychê does exist in Polybios’ narrative as a force in its own right. Walbank 
(: – and : –) identifies three different manifestations of tychê 
in Polybios: ) the completely random tychê (which in reality sometimes sim-
ply covers events which happened unpredictably, but had perfectly human 
causes), which Polybios uses to explain events outside the realm of human 
rational causality; ) tychê as a justly punishing force; and ) tychê as fate or 
providence (i.e. the one that Hirzel and von Scala identified with the Stoic 
pronoia). Walbank argues that these are, in fact, all aspects of the same power 
and that Polybios himself did not distinguish between them, but that the 
way he used them was often dictated by his political bias: anti-Roman activi-
ties are placed in the realm of the irrational and must be caused by random 
tychê while orderly, predestining tychê has helped bring the Romans to their 
world-dominating position. In his last article on the topic, Walbank () 
reiterates this view and adds that it was typical of the Greeks at Polybios’ 
time. Pédech (() – and ()), following a brief article by Fowler 
(), only identifies two sides of tychê as an actual force in Polybios: the 
predetermining, teleological tychê and the random tychê used to explain the 
rationally inexplicable. He argues that the difference between the two as-
pects is really only one of degree, not quality: the random coincidence can 
be recognised as part of the plan of fate if only one can see the big picture. 
He concludes that Polybios’ use of tychê never takes away human responsibil-
ity from his characters, but rather adds a dramatic element, representing 
history as ‘a battle between human beings and fortune’ (() ). 
 Taking these arguments further, Roveri (), in a very thorough article 
which discusses every single occurrence of tychê in the Histories, argues that 
Polybian tychê fills the part which was played by the gods in earlier Greek 
thought; i.e. that Polybios uses tychê to explain the inexplicable in history, 
which for him means anything that does not fit into his rational chains of 
causality. In reality, this often means that events which did happen for a ra-
tional reason, but were unforeseeable to Polybios’ protagonists and to him-
self, are described as happening by tychê. He argues that this use of tychê is 
necessary because of the importance Polybios places on didacticism: nothing 
can be allowed to happen for no reason, so, if no other reason can be found, 
tychê is introduced. As a force, it sometimes acts randomly, sometimes as a 
punisher because Polybios has unknowingly mixed the traditional, ‘Solo-
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cal with the physis of Book . 
 Ferrary () – essentially agrees with this view. 
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nian’, tychê with the modern, Stoic one. He also recognises that Polybios 
does occasionally use the concept in a purely rhetorical way. 
 As will be seen below, I agree in part with each of the last four argu-
ments, but I want to stress the degree to which Polybios’ use of the very 
common word tychê was guided by his narrative strategies, rather than by 
any philosophical, political, or religious concerns. 
 
 
. The First Problem: Tychê as Historical Explanation? 
Most scholars of Polybian tychê begin their studies with this passage relating 
to the uprising of Macedonia against Rome under Andriskos, or Pseudo–
Philip, in – BC (it is too long to quote in its entirety, but this is its core 
argument): 
 
(…) ὧν µὲν νὴ ∆ί’ ἀδύνατον ἢ δυσχερὲς τὰς αἰτίας καταλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον 
ὄντα, περὶ τούτων ἴσως ἄν τις ἀπορῶν ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιοῖτο 
καὶ τὴν τύχην, οἶον ὄµβρων καὶ νιφετῶν ἐξαισίων ἐπιφορὰ συνεχής (…) 
διόπερ εἰκότως περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθοῦντες ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις 
διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἱκετεύοντες καὶ θύοντες ἐξιλασκόµενοι τὸ θεῖον, 
πέµποµεν ἐρησόµενοι τοὺς θεοὺς τί ποτ’ ἂν ἢ λέγουσιν ἢ πράττουσιν ἡµῖν 
ἄµεινον εἴη καὶ γένοιτο παῦλα τῶν ἐνεστώτων κακῶν. ὧν δὲ δυνατόν ἐστι 
τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν, ἐξ ἧς καὶ δι’ ἣν ἐγένετο τὸ συµβαῖνον, οὐχί µοι δοκεῖ 
τῶν τοιούτων δεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν. 
 
Regarding things the causes of which are, by God, impossible or ex-
tremely difficult for a human being to grasp, one might perhaps as a last 
resort ascribe the cause to the god and to tychê. I mean such things as 
continuous outbreaks of unusually heavy rain and snow, or, on the other 
hand, of droughts and frosts, and the destruction of crops as a result of 
this, or such as persistent outbreaks of plague, or other occurrences like 
these, of which it is not easy to find a cause. (…) Therefore it is reason-
                                           
 More recently, Pailler () has argued for a tripartite division of Polybios’ tychê into 
) Fortuna, i.e. random fortune, ) Providentia, i.e. predetermining fortune, and ) Felicitas, 
i.e. a personal good fortune which attaches to some important human beings. To my 
knowledge, he is the only scholar to identify this last function of tychê in Polybios, and I 
have to confess that I cannot find any evidence of it in the text. More intriguing is his ar-
gument that Polybios was inspired by Aristotle’s Poetics in his use of tychê and that he was 
representing himself as a universal historian as imitating the predestining tychê (based on 
Pol. .. and ..). I remain unconvinced that Polybios was consciously basing his work 
on the Poetics, but will readily believe that his phraseology is an indication of the wide dis-
semination of Aristotelian ideas in the second century. 
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able in the case of such events, when we are at a loss, to follow the opin-
ion of the majority; and supplicating and sacrificing in order to appease 
the divine we send to ask the gods whatever we must say or do in order 
to make the situation better and escape from our present evils. But re-
garding the things for which it is possible to find the causes—both the 
original and the contributory reason why the event happened—I believe 
that we should not attribute such things to the divine. 
(Pol. ..–)  
 
First of all it is worth highlighting that Polybios in this analytical passage, 
where one would expect clarity to be of paramount importance, uses ὁ θεός, 
τὸ θεῖον, οἱ θεοί, and ἡ τύχη completely interchangeably. This shows the de-
gree to which the powers of the divine and tychê are merged in the Histories. 
Secondly, and more importantly for our present purposes, we should note 
that this passage is generally taken at face value to mean that Polybios re-
jects tychê as a historical explanation to be used by the serious historian. A 
discrepancy thus occurs with certain key points in the Histories where Poly-
bios expresses himself as if important historical events have been orches-
trated by tychê. One of the most famous examples is ..: 
 
τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἡµετέρας πραγµατείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυµάσιον τῶν καθ’ ἡµᾶς 
καιρῶν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὅτι, καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουµένης 
πράγµατα πρὸς ἓν ἔκλινε µέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἠνάγκασε πρὸς ἕνα καὶ 
τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως καὶ <δεῖ> διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ µίαν σύνοψιν 
ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισµὸν τῆς τύχης, ᾧ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν 
τῶν ὅλων πραγµάτων συντέλειαν. 
 
The special feature of my work and the amazing fact of our times is that, 
just as tychê has made almost the whole world lean towards one part and 
has forced everything to incline towards one and the same end, thus it is 
also necessary through my history to create an overview for my readers 
of the manipulation of affairs which tychê has used to accomplish the 
consummation of her whole plan. 
 
                                           
 All translations are my own and aim at closeness to the Greek rather than literary 
merit. 
 This has also been noted by Walbank () – and Pédech (). 
 See e.g. Fowler (), von Fritz (), Pédech () – and (), Walbank 
() – and (). 
 Other examples are ., ..–, and ..–. All of these will be discussed below. 
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This seems clear-cut: it is tychê that has re-focused the world so that it now 
centres on Rome, and it has done this according to a conscious and precon-
ceived plan. It seems that we need to re-examine ..  
 The essence of the methodology argument in . is that only certain 
events should be attributed to tychê and other such superhuman powers, 
namely the type of climatic phenomena which we would still today explain 
as ‘forces of nature’; everything else has a cause (αἰτία) and this cause is usu-
ally human. However, this clear-cut, rational methodology is seriously un-
dercut by what follows. When Polybios proceeds to attribute the uprising of 
Macedonia under Andriskos to δαιµονοβλάβεια, divinely sent madness, it 
becomes clear that his elaborate discussion of the right and wrong place to 
use such superhuman explanations was not, after all, a programmatic state-
ment about how the historian should go about analysing causality, but a 
narrative technique to make the actions of the Macedonians stand out as 
completely beyond the understanding of rational, thinking human beings. 
This is not because Polybios is incurably biased for Rome against any other 
state, but because he is acutely conscious of the limited choices open to 
weaker states facing stronger opponents. He repeatedly praises governments 
which face up to this and find compromises in order to maintain as much 
independence as possible under these difficult circumstances, and he de-
spises the Macedonians for being blinded to this reality by nationalism. As a 
means of showing his readers just how irrational such behaviour was, he has 
set up an elaborately prepared hyperbolical comparison with equally in-
comprehensible weather phenomena. The passage is not meant to function 
as a programme for his analyses of causality in the rest of the Histories (if it 
was, he would presumably have placed it much earlier in the work), but to 
shine a torch on Macedonian irrationality. 
 Let us now turn to the question of the instances where Polybios does use 
tychê to explain historical causality. A much discussed passage is .., which 
has been quoted above. This forms part of the preface to the Histories, and in 
this passage Polybios apparently attributes to the workings of tychê the sym-
plokê, the bringing together of world events to form an organic whole 
brought about by the conquering of the known world by Rome. The same 
thought is expressed shortly afterwards in ..–. Even if we disregard the 
                                           
 See Eckstein () ch. .  
 Von Fritz () – argues that there is no logical contradiction because the results 
of human wisdom or folly must be ascribed to human wisdom or folly, whereas the wis-
dom or folly itself can be said to come from a superhuman cause. This is impeccable 
logic, but surely Polybios was able to think of some reasons the Macedonians might have 
had to rise up against Rome. Attributing their decision to daimonoblabeia and comparing it 
with climatic phenomena is hyperbolical rhetoric. 
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categorical rejection of tychê as a historical explanation found in ., an-
other problem with these two passages remains: they contradict a number of 
statements in the Histories to the effect that Rome did not acquire her empire 
by tychê, but by her own will and skill. The most famous of these passages is 
..: 
 
ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἡµῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς οὐ τύχῃ  ʇΡωµαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι 
δοκοῦσι τῶν ῾Ελλήνων, οὐδ’ αὐτοµάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως, ἐν τοιούτοις 
καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγµασιν ἐνασκήσαντες, οὐ µόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν 
ὅλων ἡγεµονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολµηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως.  
 
From these facts it is clear what I stated at the beginning, namely that it 
was not because of tychê, as some of the Greeks think, nor by chance, but 
altogether reasonably that the Romans, having trained in such great en-
terprises, not only boldly devoted themselves to world-dominion, but 
also succeeded in their plan. 
 
Several similar passages can be found in the first six books of the Histories 
(Pol. .., .., ..). The combined message of these statements is clear: 
the Romans wanted their empire and they worked hard for it; it was not 
handed to them by tychê. 
 This discrepancy has occasioned much scholarly discussion. The most 
convincing explanations, to my mind, have been provided by Shorey () 
and Roveri (). They both argue that ., which names tychê as the power 
behind the symplokê, is distinguished by being part of the preface of the Histo-
ries and is as such an extremely rhetorical passage designed to catch the 
reader’s interest. Its use of tychê is not meant to be taken literally, but only to 
fire the reader’s curiosity, much like a storyteller would introduce an impor-
tant turning point in a tale by the phrase ‘—but fate had not decreed that…’ 
without necessarily subscribing to a religious belief in fate. Even though 
neither Shorey nor Roveri goes quite that far, this solution in fact hints at a 
dichotomy between two different narratorial registers in the Histories: the rhe-
torical storyteller mode on the one hand and the rationalist historian mode on the 
other. I would argue that this theory adequately describes the situation in 
the rest of the Histories. Throughout the work, a number of analytical and 
polemical passages are explicit about attributing events to human causes 
                                           
 For various explanations see Walbank () – and () –, Pédech () 
–, Roveri (), Ferrary () –, who, however, all agree in rejecting the 
older theory of a development in Polybios’ thought. 
 Contra Walbank () – and Pédech () –. 
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rather than to fortune, side by side with a few highly rhetorical passages 
which refer to tychê as a predestining force which influences history.  
 Let us look at some examples: ..– and ..– are two analytical, 
polemical passages where Polybios projects an image of himself as a rational 
intellectual above the foolishness of the uneducated. ..– argues that 
Scipio Africanus the Elder was not ‘favoured by tychê’ (εὐτυχής) and did not 
achieve his victories ‘contrary to rational expectation and by chance’ 
(παραλόγως καὶ ταὐτοµάτῳ). Polybios goes on to say that, on the contrary, 
Scipio did everything ‘rationally’ (κατὰ λόγον), he was ‘extremely rational’ 
(εὐλόγιστος) and ‘intelligent’ (φρένας ἔχων)—all expressions designed to rule 
out any supernatural causes behind Scipio’s successes. The claim in the 
same passage that such men are ‘most divine’ (θειοτάτους) and ‘most beloved 
by the gods’ (προσφιλεστάτους τοῖς θεοῖς) is a provocative paradox con-
structed to catch the reader’s attention and make him reconsider his ideas of 
the divine and divine favour. It is not, however, a denial of the existence of a 
divine power. It redefines both the unfathomable divine and the capricious 
tychê (incorporated in εὐτυχής) and turns them into one force, which imbues 
certain human beings with intelligence and rational thought, talents which it 
is then up to them to put to good use. ..– discusses the reasons for the 
success of the Achaean League. Here, the narrator states that it would be 
simple-minded (φαῦλον) to say that the League owes its success to tychê. 
Rather, it is due to the freedom of speech and principles of democracy prac-
ticed by the League, principles which gradually win over everyone, even 
those incorporated against their will. 
 In both of these passages, then, the Polybian narrator ascribes historical 
events or developments not to tychê or other superhuman forces, but to hu-
man factors such as intelligence, planning, and political institutions. It is no 
coincidence that both passages are analytical and polemical. Other analyti-
cal and polemical passages which argue for rational historical explanations 
over superhuman ones are .., which argues that Hannibal managed to 
cross the Alps because of his own careful planning, not by means of divine 
assistance, and ..–, which argues that Scipio the Elder’s success at New 
Carthage was due to his own careful calculations rather than to assistance 
from either the divine or tychê. Equivalent, but inverted, are .., ..– 
and ., all of which attribute the misfortunes of a people not to fortune—
implying that this is a common misconception—but to their own stupidity 
or lack of ability to learn from the mistakes of others. 
 Now compare ..– (the build-up to the Battle of Zama) and ..–
 (the folly of the Achaean leaders on the eve of the Achaean War). Both 
                                           
 Pédech () – reaches a similar conclusion about this passage, but only speaks 
of the divine, not tychê. 
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passages refer to tychê as a force which directs historical events, but both are 
also highly rhetorical and dramatic. ..– opens with a rhetorical ques-
tion introduced by ‘Who would not…’ (τίς οὐκ ἄν), one of Polybios’ favour-
ite rhetorical tools. It continues with a dramatic listing of everything that 
marked out the Battle of Zama as momentous, introducing every entry on 
the list by an anaphoric negation (οὔτε, οὔθ’, οὐδέ, οὐ γάρ). The role of tychê is 
that of a producer of metaphorical games offering as the prize of combat the 
hegemony over the entire known world (οὐδὲ µὴν ἆθλα µείζω τὴν τύχην 
ἐκτεθεικυῖαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζοµένοις τῶν τότε προκειµένων). ..– is a rhetori-
cal blame passage which pours scorn on the Achaean leaders at the out-
break of the Achaean War. Here, we see the rhetoric in the hendiadys of 
‘stupidity and lack of judgment’ (τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς ἀκρισίας), the hyperboli-
cal comparison of the leaders’ folly with that of barbarians, and the provoca-
tive claim that they were saved from self-destruction only by their defeat by 
Rome. The role of tychê here and the metaphors employed to express it are 
more elaborate than in ..–: she is personified and said to be ‘resource-
ful and clever’ (πανοῦργος καὶ τεχνική), she ‘sets herself firmly’ against the 
folly of the Achaean leaders, and when she lets Greece be defeated, she is 
acting like a ‘good wrestler’ who is forced to resort to desperate measures in 
order to avert defeat. 
 Surely the presence of these metaphors—tychê as games producer, tychê 
as wrestler—is important, as is the qualifying ‘as if’ (καθαπερανεί) in ..–
. Polybios is not here propounding a belief in tychê as a predestining power 
which directs the affairs of human beings. Rather, he is using all the rhetori-
cal tools in his box in order to compose an exciting and affecting narrative 
in ..– and an indignant invective in ..–. It would be wrong to 
hold up the picture of tychê produced by these passages alongside the one 
produced by his analytical, polemical passages and call this a logical dis-
crepancy. 
 This solution begs the question whether Polybios intended his readers to 
regard this tychê, which directs human affairs like an umpire or a theatre 
producer, as purely a rhetorical metaphor or as an actual existing superhu-
man power. Shorey and Roveri come close to arguing for a rhetorical use 
disconnected from all belief. However, a passage in Book  on the value of 
universal history as opposed to monographs points to a different interpreta-
tion (..–): 
 
                                           
 This parallels the Macedonian case in . and again serves to emphasise the self-
destructive insanity of ignoring the limited possibilities for states with limited power. 
 The theatrical metaphor is used by Pailler () as a point of departure for some in-
teresting thoughts on the possible connection between Aristotle’s Poetics and Polybios. 
 Lisa I. Hau 
 
πῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψιλῶς αὐτὰς καθ’ αὑτὰς ἀναγνόντα τὰς Σικελικὰς ἢ τὰς 
Ἰβηρικὰς πράξεις, γνῶναι καὶ µαθεῖν ἢ τὸ µέγεθος τῶν γεγονότων ἢ τὸ 
συνέχον, τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας τὸ παραδοξότατον καθ’ ἡµᾶς 
ἔργον ἡ τύχη συνετέλεσεν, τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι τὸ πάντα τὰ γνωριζόµενα µέρη τῆς 
οἰκουµένης ὑπὸ µίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀγαγεῖν, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ 
εὑρίσκεται γεγονός. 
 
For how is it possible, simply by reading about Sicilian or Iberian affairs 
by themselves, to get to know and to learn either the size of the events or 
their extent, in what way and by what kind of constitution tychê accom-
plished the improbable event of our time—I mean bringing the entire 
known world under one rule and dominion, which is not found to have 
happened before? 
 
Although this is a polemical passage, its argument is about the relative merit 
of different types of historiography, not about historical causation; Polybios 
therefore uses tychê as a historical agent in the same rhetorical way as in 
those two other prefatorial passages, in order to give weight and importance 
to his overall theme and thus convince his readers that such a theme can 
only be dealt with by universal history. Echoing .. and .., Polybios de-
fines the purpose of his work as answering the question ‘in what way and by 
which constitution’ (τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας) Rome has become 
the dominating power of the world.  However, in contrast with the similar 
passages, the subject of the sentence is not Rome itself, but tychê. If tychê can 
act through Rome’s constitution, this is a case of double determination in 
the tradition of Homeric epic, Athenian tragedy and, indeed, earlier histori-
ography:  
 
just as Herodotos composed a narrative in which Kroisos was at the same 
time destined to suffer and brought about his own suffering, Polybios has 
created a narrative in which Rome acquires world dominion at the same 
                                           
 Kroisos’ downfall is predestined by the fact that he is the fifth descendant of Gyges, 
and as such must be punished for his ancestor’s crime (.–), but Herodotos also states 
that Kroisos was punished by a nemesis from the gods because he believed himself to be 
the happiest man in the world (..). A similar double determination can probably be 
seen at work in the fate of each of the Persian kings as well as that of Polykrates. See par-
ticularly Harrison () passim, but also Gould () –, Lateiner () –, 
and Fornara (). Contra, e.g., Shimron (). The parallel between Polybian and 
Herodotean combined human and superhuman causation is also noted by Green () 
, who, however, argues that Polybios only endorses the superhuman aspect in order to 
relieve the Greeks of the responsibility for having been defeated by Rome. This is refuted 
by Pol. .–. 
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time because tychê wills it so and because Rome herself wants it and works 
towards it. In Herodotos it is becoming increasingly respectable to accept 
this as the historian’s irrational religious belief, and so we should in Poly-
bios also. We may find it hard to accept that an ‘enlightened’ Hellenistic in-
tellectual like Polybios should hold such ‘archaic’ beliefs, but perhaps that 
just shows that they were not so archaic after all. At any rate, Polybios’ will-
ingness openly to express such a view shows that he did not expect his read-
ers to sneer at it.  
 To summarise: Polybios’ attitude to tychê is different when he is analysing 
and arguing polemically about historical causality and when he is striving 
for rhetorical or emotional effect. We can call these two different attitudes 
different narratorial registers or modes: the systematic, scientific historian, who in 
analytical and frequently polemical passages deliberately minimises the in-
fluence of superhuman powers, including tychê, in order to maximise human 
skill, will, and rational planning; and the rhetorician and storyteller, who uses 
tychê freely, often as a predestining force directly involved in human affairs, 
in order to arouse emotion, lend importance to his theme, and keep his au-
dience engaged. This, I would argue, solves the first problem, the discrep-
ancy between Polybios’ explicit statements in certain passages that tychê 
should not be used as a historical explanation and his use of it as exactly that 
in other passages.  
 Polybios’ ability and readiness to switch between narrative strategies 
does not, however, preclude a belief in tychê as an existing force; in fact, 
some passages such as ..– make it almost certain that he held such a be-
lief. I shall return to this issue below while trying to solve the second prob-
lem: the apparently different meanings of the word tychê in the Histories. 
  
                                           
 Von Fritz ()  reaches a similar conclusion, but does not call it double deter-
mination and distinguishes between the Roman constitution, virtues, training, and ef-
forts, which were the Romans’ own achievements, and the fact that the Romans ac-
quired a superiority in these areas, which was due to tychê. I think this solution is too 
modern in its logic; Polybios would not have distinguished so rigidly. 
 This has been especially convincingly argued by Fornara () and Harrison (). 
 As has been noted by Walbank () : ‘if one compares the religious attitudes of 
Polybios with those of Herodotos, one finds the same incoherence and inconsistency in 
both. This perhaps suggests that the incoherence is characteristic of popular Greek reli-
gious thought in general, and not merely an aspect of its collapse in the Hellenistic age.’ 
Cf. Parker () : ‘One may wonder, indeed, whether the problem is not when clas-
sical religion gives way to Hellenistic but whether it does: whether, that is, the convention 
of dividing histories of Greek religion into two chronological sections rather than three or 
four or ten has any substantive justification.’ 
 Lisa I. Hau 
 
. The Second Problem: the Nature of Tychê in the Histories 
In the Histories, tychê is sometimes simply the natural word to use for 
‘good/bad circumstance’; at other times Polybios uses it periphrastically in-
stead of an expression with τυγχάνω. Most often, however, it seems to be 
some kind of superhuman force at work in the world and influencing his-
tory. It has long been common to say that this force is at some places in the 
work a predestining ‘fate’ as we have seen above, at others a just avenger, 
and in yet other passages random ‘fortune’. As a sub-class of this last cate-
gory it occasionally seems to mean merely ‘luck’ or ‘coincidence’ considered 
from the subjective point of view of a focaliser of a passage without implying 
any superhuman involvement. The four functions—fate, just avenger, ran-
dom fortune, chance—are logically mutually exclusive: how can tychê at the 
same time be inconsistent and just? How can it be simultaneously random 
and predestining? And how does subjective luck fit into any of these catego-
ries? Again, theories of a development in Polybios’ thought are unconvinc-
ing because several functions can be at play within the same passage. 
 I have been working on solving this puzzle for a while, and my first in-
stinct was to try to establish an overview of when tychê means what in the 
text. Table  offers my first interpretation (to be modified drastically below) 
of each instance of tychê in the Histories according to its motive as predestin-
ing, random, or just. A few remarks about the table are in order: for the sake 
of clarity every reference was entered only once although the exact sense of 
tychê in some of them could be interpreted in more than one way. In .., 
for example, the storms which have forced the Romans to yield the sea to 
the Carthaginians are called ‘blows of tychê’ (τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συµπτώµασιν) 
with no indication of whether this tychê is random or predestining. I chose to 
interpret it as random tychê and placed the reference in that category. Con-
versely, .., which states that the Romans did not acquire their empire by 
means of tychê and has been quoted above, was placed in the predestining 
category according to the conventional reading of that passage although 
tychê here might as well mean ‘random fortune’. References to a tychê that 
can be understood as either predestining or random are marked in bold; 
references to a tychê that might be either random or justly avenging are 
marked in italics. The reason why only five passages appear in the ‘just aven-
                                           
 These categories have been established by Walbank () –, (), and () 
and are followed by the majority of scholars. For a slightly different definition of the dif-
ferent meanings of tychê see Pédech () –; for a very different definition see Pailler 
().  
 See e.g. ..–. Here, the force behind the just punishment is explicitly named 
tychê, but at the same time Polybios expects the reader to have blamed tychê at one time or 
another for its inconsistency.  
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ger’ category is that all passages where the justice of tychê is qualified by ex-
pressions such as ‘just as if’ (ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες or καθάπερ(ανει)) or expressed 
purely through a metaphor have been left out. This decision was made on 
the reasoning that ‘just as if’ qualifications make an expression counterfac-
tual and thereby (as von Fritz () – observed long ago) actually pre-
clude any real avenging motive on the part of tychê. (‘He gave her a ring just 
as if he was serious about their relationship’ is counterfactual in that it 
throws up the possibility that the protagonist might have been serious about 
said relationship, but at the same time clearly shows that he is not.) The 
metaphorical passages, which mostly represent tychê as an umpire who hands 
victory to the most deserving combatant (.., .., ..), seemed to 
me to be just one step removed from the ‘just as if’ statements, the link being 
provided by .., which is a simile rather than a metaphor and says that 
tychê acted ‘just like a good umpire (ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς βραβευτής)’, thus alerting 
the reader to a figure of speech that should not be taken literally. ‘Just as if’ 
passages and metaphorical expressions have therefore been placed in the 
‘random’ category. 
 
Table  
 
Periphrastically for τυγχά-
νω 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., fr. 
 line  
Good fortune / misfortune / 
circumstances 
.., .., .., .., .., .. 
Predestining ‘fate’ .., .., .., .., .., ..–, .. 
Random ‘fortune’ .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., .. 
(twice), .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.. (twice), .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .a., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .. 
(twice), .., .., .., ..– (twice), 
.., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .., fr.  line , fr. ., fr. . 
Just avenger .., .., .., .., .. 
Subjective ‘luck’ .. 
 
 Lisa I. Hau 
 
The difficulties in distinguishing between what we would consider mutually 
exclusive meanings or forces of tychê (marked by bold and italics in the table) 
provide a first indication that something is wrong with the categorisation. I 
initially assumed that the key to solving the problem lay in the uneven dis-
tribution of passages, and I began re-reading all the passages where tychê ap-
pears to be either justly avenging or predestining—the smaller categories in 
the table—in order to figure out how they could be re-interpreted into dem-
onstrating random tychê, the largest category. The more I pondered the mo-
tives of Polybian tychê, however, the more it became clear that I was asking 
the wrong question. What seems to be uppermost in the mind of the narra-
tor of the Histories whenever he employs the word tychê is, in fact, not its mo-
tive—although that is occasionally expressed by means of metaphors or ‘just 
as if’s, making it clear that the reader should not take the statement at face 
value (see above)—but its results, or rather the perception of these results by 
the human actors in the narrative. More specifically, tychê is used to mark 
out events which happen outside of human control (or at least the control of 
the focaliser of a given passage) and are unexpected, strikingly coincidental, 
or momentous. 
 To provide some examples, let us look first at the passages usually 
thought to show predestining tychê discussed above: in both .., which has 
Roman dominion brought about by tychê, and in .., which argues that 
Roman dominion did not come about by tychê, the main point seems to be 
not whether tychê is a predestining or random power, but that it is outside of 
human control. In .. it seems to be shorthand for ‘divine favour, destiny, 
luck, and other forces outside of human control’ and is kept deliberately 
vague because it is used to roll the various arguments of many different 
groups of ‘Greeks’ into one in order to facilitate the counter-argument. This 
umbrella-function is, indeed, the true function of most of the passages in the 
Histories which set up a contrast between tychê and human will and skill (see 
above p. ). In these passages the narrator uses tychê not to say anything 
about the predestining, just, or random nature of superhuman powers, but 
as a cover-all for everything outside human control, which can then be con-
trasted with human ability and rationality. Tykhe can be used for this exactly 
because it is such a nebulous term. In .. it lends rhetorical grandeur to the 
passage by showing an almost gods-eye view of historical events leaning in 
towards a central point. Nothing is said about its nature or motives; it is used 
to mark out the event as momentous. 
 Similarly, in ..–, where tychê works together with the Roman consti-
tution to bring about world domination in an instance of double determina-
                                           
 Pol. .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., 
.., .. (twice), .., .. (twice), .., .., .., ... 
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tion (see above p. ), the narratorial emphasis is not on the possible moti-
vation of tychê, but on the momentousness of the outcome of events. Mo-
mentousness is certainly the issue behind the use of tychê in passages such as 
.., where tychê is said to have laid out Africa and Europe as prizes for the 
contestants in the Battle of Zama, and .., where tychê is said to have 
brought about Xerxes’ invasion of Greece. In the case of ..– there is 
perhaps, in addition, a feeling of unexpectedness. Such a combination of 
unexpectedness and momentousness seems to be the focus of passages such 
as .., which states that no ‘unforeseen event of tychê (παράλογον τὴς 
τύχης)’ has occurred in Asia and Egypt in Polybios’ time. A combination of 
momentousness and striking coincidence seems to underlie Polybios’ use of 
tychê in passages such as .., where tychê is said to have ‘renewed the entire 
known world (τὴν τύχην ὡσανεὶ κεκαινοποηκέναι πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν 
οἰκουµένην)’ because the leaders of Macedonia, Egypt, and the Seleucid 
Kingdom have all died around the same time. 
 The same is true when we turn to examine passages that were in Table  
ascribed to random tychê. A good example is this ranting lecture on when 
people are and are not to blame for their own misfortunes (..–): 
 
τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας παραλόγως περιπεσεῖν τινι τῶν δεινῶν οὐ τῶν 
παθόντων, τῆς τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκληµα, τὸ δ’ ἀκρίτως 
καὶ προφανῶς περιβαλεῖν αὑτοὺς ταὶς µεγίσταις συµφοραῖς ὁµολογούµενόν 
ἐστι τῶν πασχόντων ἁµάρτηµα. διὸ καὶ τοῖς µὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν ἔλεος 
ἕπεται µετὰ συγγνώµης κἀπικουρία, τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀβουλίαν 
ὄνειδος κἀπιτίµησις συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν. 
 
To suffer some disaster unexpectedly is, in as much as we are human be-
ings, not the fault of the sufferers, but of tychê and those who have done it 
to them, but to throw oneself thoughtlessly and with open eyes into the 
greatest misfortunes is decidedly the fault of the sufferers themselves. For 
that reason pity is accorded to those who come into trouble because of 
tychê, along with forgiveness and assistance, while those who do so be-
cause of their own foolishness receive blame and criticism from right-
thinking men. 
 
Here tychê is said to be to blame for misfortunes which strike people unex-
pectedly, but the focus of the passage is not really on the nature of tychê, but 
on the contrast between sufferings that are the victims’ own fault and those 
brought upon them from outside. For these latter sufferings, the one to 
blame is ‘tychê and those who have done it to them’, i.e. some sufferings are 
brought on a person by other people, some by events outside of human con-
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trol. This expression clearly shows that tychê is, once again, being used as an 
umbrella-term to cover everything outside of human control. 
 A more specialised use of tychê can be seen in passages where the focus is 
on the unexpectedness of the events and, often, on a striking coincidence of 
some kind. One example is a passage that is often adduced to show tychê in 
the guise of just avenger (..): 
 
τοὺς µὲν οὖν ἐφόρους δειπνοῦντας καταλαβὼν πάντας αὐτοῦ κατέσφαξε, τῆς 
τύχης τὴν ἁρµόζουσαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθείσης δίκην. καὶ γὰρ ὑφ’ οὗ καὶ ὑπὲρ οὗ 
ταῦτ’ ἔπαθον, δικαίως αὐτοὺς ἄν τις φήσειε πεπονθέναι. 
 
And so catching the ephors while they were eating dinner he slaughtered 
them all there, tychê inflicting on them a fitting punishment. For consid-
ering the man by whose hands and for whose sake they suffered this, one 
could say that they had suffered justly. 
 
The narrator says that tychê struck corrupt Spartan ephors with ‘deserved 
punishment’ (ἁρµόζουσαν δίκην) without implying that a conscious plan of 
justice lay behind this. In fact, as the preceding narrative details the motives 
and plan of the assassin, the main point of the use of tychê in the narrative of 
the murder does not seem to be that the death of the ephors was brought 
about by a supernatural power with its own motivation, but rather that it 
happened unexpectedly and by a striking coincidence happened to be deserved.  
 Another example is .. where the narrator has just been describing 
how much the Rhodians hate Philip V (..–): 
 
καὶ γὰρ ἡ τύχη πρός γε τοῦτο τὸ µέρος αὐτῷ συνήργησε προφανῶς. ὅτε γὰρ 
ὁ πρεσβευτὴς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τὸν ἀπολογισµὸν ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τοὺς Ῥοδίους, 
ἐµφανίζων τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου µεγαλοψυχίαν, καὶ διότι τρόπον τινὰ κρατῶν 
ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δίδωσι τῷ δήµῳ τὴν χάριν ταύτην, ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο 
βουλόµενος ἐλέγξαι µὲν τὰς τῶν ἀντιπραττόντων αὐτῷ διαβολάς, φανερὰν 
δὲ τῇ πόλει καταστῆσαι τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν. καὶ παρῆν τις ἐκ κατάπλου 
πρὸς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἀναγγέλλων τὸν ἐξανδραποδισµὸν τῶν Κιανῶν καὶ τὴν 
ὠµότητα τοῦ Φιλίππου τὴν ἐν τούτοις γεγενηµένην, ὥστε τοὺς Ῥοδίους, 
ἔτι µεταξὺ τοῦ πρεσβευτοῦ τὰ προειρηµένα λέγοντος, ἐπεὶ προελθὼν ὁ 
πρύτανις διεσάφει τὰ προσηγγελµένα, µὴ δύνασθαι πιστεῦσαι διὰ τὴν 
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀθεσίας.  
 
Tyche clearly contributed to this matter [i.e. the Rhodians’ hatred] for 
him [i.e. Philip]. For when the ambassador was delivering his speech to 
the Rhodians, in which he emphasised the great generosity of Philip and 
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said that he, who was already in a manner of speaking master of their 
city, was granting this favour to the people, and that he was doing this 
because he wanted to prove wrong the slander of his enemies and to 
show his nature quite clearly to the city—at that very moment a man 
came into the prytaneion, straight from having landed by ship, and an-
nounced the enslavement of the people of Kios and the cruelty shown to 
them by Philip, with the result that the Rhodians, when the prytanis 
came forward and revealed the news while the ambassador was still in 
the middle of his speech, could not believe it, so great was the extent of 
the treachery. 
 
The narrator’s reason for stating that tychê has furthered the hatred of the 
Rhodians against Philip seems not to be a belief that this happened because 
of the intervention of a superhuman power, but rather the fact of the striking 
coincidence that an eyewitness who could testify to Philip’s cruelty towards de-
feated cities should show up just as Philip’s ambassador was extolling his 
mildness. The coincidence seems to fulfill a higher sense of justice in that it 
shows Philip’s lies for what they are, and such coincidences which in an un-
foreseen and unpredictable way bring about justice are very often ascribed 
to tychê by the Polybian narrator (e.g. ..–). In every case, however, the 
sense of coincidence seems to be stronger than the sense of justice, and tychê 
is used also when the coincidence brings about not justice, but a pretext for 
action long desired (..), disaster (.., ..), symmetry (..), 
or simply change (..). It is likely that some of these instances, such as 
..– above, show double determination—tychê working through or in 
conjunction with human agents—rather than a purely rhetorical use of the 
word, but even so, the narrator never specifies the motivation of tychê, except 
metaphorically (see above pp. –). 
 Table  shows a tentative distribution of passages according to the inter-
nally perceived result of tychê: 
  
                                           
 Cf. Walbank () ad loc. 
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Table   
(Includes all instances of tychê where it does not mean good fortune/misfortune  
or is used periphrastically for τυγχάνω.) 
.. = indirect discourse; o.r. = direct speech 
 
Passage 
 
Perception of the event which warrants the use tychê 
 .  
Outside of 
human 
control (or 
the control 
of the foca-
liser) 
.  
Risky 
(fortunes 
of war) 
. 
Unexpect-
ed 
. 
Momen-
tous 
. 
Striking coincidence  
(of timing, justice, or fittingness)  
a. 
Sudden 
change 
from 
height of 
good 
fortune 
to depth 
of mis-
fortune 
or vice 
versa 
b. 
Turning 
a situa-
tion on 
its head 
c. 
Strikes 
the 
overcon-
fident 
d.  
Some 
other 
type of 
striking 
coinci-
dence 
.. X    X    
.. bis   X X     
..   X X     
..  X       
..  X        
..    X     
.. (o.o.) X        
.. X        
..  X   X    
.. (o.o.) X        
..   X  X X  X 
..– bis X  X      
..        X 
..  X       
..   X X X    
..    X     
.. X        
.. bis 
(o.o.) 
X X       
.. (o.o.) X        
..    X    X 
..    X      
..  X        
.. (ironic) X   X     
.. (o.o.) X X       
.. X  X      
.. X  X X    X 
.. X   X    X 
..   X     X 
.. X        
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.. (o.o.) X       X 
.. (o.o.) X   X     
..   X  X    
.. X        
.. X  X X X    
.. X        
..–   X X     
.. X  X      
.. X X       
.. (o.r.) X        
.. X        
.. X        
.. X        
.. X X       
.. X X       
.. X X       
.. X        
.. (o.r.) X  X      
.. X X   X    
.. (o.r.) X  X      
..– X X       
.a. X X   X X   
.. X X       
.. (o.r.) X X       
.. (o.o.) X X       
..  X  X     
.. (o.r.) X X  X     
..– X X       
.. (o.o.)  X   X  X  
.. (o.o.)  X   X  X  
.. (o.o.) X X X      
..– X  X  X  X  
.. X  X X X  X  
.. X    X    
.. X  X     X 
.. X  X      
.. X       X 
.. X    X    
.. X       X 
.. X X X      
.. X X       
..    X     
.. X X       
..    X     
.. (o.o.) X X   X    
.. (o.o.)  X  X     
..     X  X X 
..     X  X X 
..     X  X X 
.. X X   X    
.. X        
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.. X X   X    
..        X 
.. N/A: this gives the title of the work Περὶ τύχης by Demetrios of Phaleron. 
.. X  X  X   X 
.. X  X  X    
..   X X X    
.. X X       
.. X        
.. X        
.. X    X    
.. X        
.. X X   X    
..   X  X X  X 
..– 
twice 
X        
..    X     
.. X        
.. X    X    
.. (o.o.) X      X  
.. X        
.. X  X  X X   
.. (o.r.)       X X 
.. X X   X    
..     X    
Fr.  X        
Fr. . Impossible to say  
Fr.  Impossible to say  
 
 
Category  is the largest category in the table; it encompasses instances of 
tychê where the narrator’s main reason for using the expression seems to be 
to stress that what happened was outside of human control or at least out-
side of the control of his focaliser(s). In many instances a tick/cross in this 
category is supplemented by a tick/cross in one or more other categories for 
the same passage because, as in the passages discussed above, the point 
made is often a combination of lack of human control and unexpectedness, 
momentousness, or striking coincidence, which are in the table as categories 
, , and  respectively. Categories a–d are sub-categories of category , 
the striking coincidence: it seems always to be the idea of something striking 
happening unexpected that seems to be at the top of the narrator’s mind, 
regardless of whether it is striking because of a dramatic change in some-
one’s fortunes, because of a complete reversal of a situation, or because of 
some kind of poetic justice. 
 Let us turn now to category , which is a type of passage so far kept out 
of the discussion. This category contains passages where it is the high risk 
involved in taking part in an event (typically a war or battle) that warrants 
the use of tychê to describe it, and it is found especially in a certain type of 
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tychê passage which is common in Polybios. These passages are concerned 
with the human tendency to become overconfident and forget about the un-
certainty of life, the part of life outside of one’s own control, the part repre-
sented by tychê. Common expressions are ‘to try tychê’ (τῆς τύχης πειραῖν, e.g. 
..) in the sense of risking battle or war and ‘to trust in tychê’ (τῇ τύχῃ 
(δια)πίστειν, e.g. .., ..), in the sense of foolishly expecting good 
(military) fortune to last. The tychê of these passages is always regarded by 
the narrator, and often by the characters, as fickle, sometimes as random, 
and occasionally as deliberately spiteful or vengeful. However, I would ar-
gue that the focus of the passages is only secondarily on the nature or moti-
vation of tychê and primarily on the behaviour of the human characters of 
the Histories.  
 An example is the famous passage where Scipio the Younger and Poly-
bios, as a character in his own work, together watch Carthage burn. Here 
Scipio expresses fears that the same fate may one day overtake Rome, and 
Polybios the narrator comments (..–): 
 
ταύτης δὲ δύναµιν πραγµατικωτέραν καὶ νουνεχεστέραν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν· 
τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς µεγίστοις κατορθώµασι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν συµφοραῖς 
ἔννοιαν λαµβάνειν τῶν οἰκείων πραγµάτων καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας περιστάσεως 
καὶ καθόλου πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιτυχίαις τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐπισφάλειαν 
ἀνδρός ἐστι µεγάλου καὶ τελείου καὶ συλλήβδην ἀξίου µνήµης. 
 
It is difficult to mention a more statesmanlike and perceptive ability than 
this: in the moment of greatest victory and of catastrophe for the enemy 
to have thought for one’s own fate and the opposite situation and, to put 
it briefly, to keep in mind in success the instability of tychê—that charac-
terises a great man and one worthy of remembrance. 
 
Tykhe is here used to express the idea of the uncertainty of human life, the 
mindfulness of which should make people stay humble even in their greatest 
success. She is said to be unstable by nature, or to encompass instability 
within her (τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐπισφάλειαν), but no speculation is offered about 
her motivation, and the focus is firmly on human behaviour in the face of 
such perceived instability.  
 
And this, I think, is the key to solving the puzzle of tychê in Polybios. When 
we ask whether tychê to Polybios’ mind was random, justly avenging, or pre-
destining, we are asking the wrong question. What is important in all  in-
stances of tychê in the Histories is, in fact, not its motive or nature (although 
that is very occasionally speculated about) and not even its results, but the 
perception of these results by the human actors in the narrative. These re-
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sults are outside of human—or the focaliser’s—control, they show up hu-
man life as unstable and unpredictable, they are unexpected, and very often 
striking in some way. Sometimes they happen to bring about an unforeseen 
turn of events pleasing to a human sense of justice, at other times world 
events seem to have been directed towards the same end over such an ex-
tended period of time that they seem to have been guided by a predestining 
‘fate’, but these are not necessary corollaries. If quizzed about his thoughts 
on the motives of this superhuman power, Polybios might well have replied 
that they are unfathomable for mere mortals. And this, like his belief in 
double determination, brings him in line with traditional Greek religious 
thought, as represented by Herodotos. 
 
 
. Conclusion 
What can we conclude from all of this? We began with a discussion of Poly-
bios’ use of tychê as an explanation for historical events. It was shown that he 
employs (at least) two different narratorial registers, which use tychê differ-
ently: in the analytical, ‘scientific’ historian mode he uses tychê as a mystical force 
opposed to human skill and intelligence, downplays its significance, and 
ridicules those who use it as an explanation. Alternating with this, in his rhe-
torical storyteller mode he has no hesitations in attributing momentous events 
to tychê.  
 In the second half of the paper we looked closer at Polybios’ use of tychê 
and the traditional scholarly distribution of its spheres of power in the Histo-
ries as predestining, random, and just. I argued that Polybios would have 
been surprised by such a categorisation because he used tychê in order to say 
something about the human experience of the world rather than about the 
motivation or nature of superhuman powers. Pédech (: –), Roveri 
(), and (from a different angle) Brouwer () have argued that Polybios 
attributed to tychê whatever events he could not explain rationally. I would 
argue that Polybios would have been, and thought himself to be, able to ex-
plain most events rationally if he investigated their causes, and that he 
rather used tychê to mark out events that he wanted his readers to regard in a 
certain way: as unexpected, as momentous, as strikingly coincidental, or as 
juxtaposed to what a given character or state achieved or could achieve by 
his own efforts.  
 I am not arguing that Polybios did not believe in tychê and only used the 
concept as a rhetorical tool. By contrast, his own life experience must have 
                                           
 Incomprehensible superhuman forces in Herodotos: e.g. Hdt. .–, .–, 
.–. See also Fornara (). 
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impressed upon him the large role played in human life by powers outside of 
human, or individual control, and some passages show him subscribing to 
a belief in double determination. But rather than the motivation or nature of 
such superhuman forces, it was the human experience of them that was usu-
ally uppermost in his mind.  
 Paradoxically, it is the use of tychê that gives Polybios’ Histories its human-
ity: by insisting on the existence of this dangerous element of uncertainty the 
narrator ensures that even his most perfect heroes can meet a grim fate and 
still be worthy of the reader’s admiration. Thus Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and 
Philopoimen are all great men undiminished by their final succumbing to 
tychê dysphylaktos kai paralogos. It is also Polybios’ use of tychê that most clearly 
gives the reader a sense of what living through the narrated events must 
have felt like; it sidesteps the hindsight which otherwise characterises much 
of the Histories by re-injecting into the narrative a sense of unpredictability. 
Thus the pervasive presence of tychê in the discourse brings the point of view 
of the readers in line with that of the characters caught in the midst of be-
wildering events. It is a way of conveying to a reader distant in time the sur-
prise, the shock, and the awe experienced by people who took part in or 
witnessed the events of the Histories without knowing how it would all turn 
out in the end. 
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 In this I agree with Eckstein () – although, as explained above, I do not 
agree with his theory of a development in Polybios’ use of tychê. 
 For some thoughts on hindsight in Polybius’ Histories see my forthcoming article in a 
volume on hindsight in historiography edited by Anton Powell and Kai Brodersen.  
 Lisa I. Hau 
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